We argue that ethically significant behavior of autonomous systems should be guided by explicit ethical principles determined through a consensus of ethicists. Such a consensus is likely to emerge in many areas in which intelligent autonomous systems are apt to be deployed and for the actions they are liable to undertake, as we are more likely to agree on how machines ought to treat us than on how human beings ought to treat one another. Given such a consensus, particular cases of ethical dilemmas where ethicists agree on the ethically relevant features and the right course of action can be used to help discover principles needed for ethical guidance of the behavior of autonomous systems. Such principles help ensure the ethical behavior of complex and dynamic systems and further serve as a basis for justification of this behavior. To provide assistance in discovering ethical principles, we have developed G E , a general ethical dilemma analyzer that, through a dialog with ethicists, uses inductive logic programming to codify ethical principles in any given domain. G E has been used to codify principles in a number of domains pertinent to the behavior of autonomous systems and these principles have been verified using an Ethical Turing Test, a test devised to compare the judgments of codified principles with that of ethicists.
Introduction
Systems that interact with human beings require particular attention to the ethical ramifications of their behavior. A profusion of such systems is on the verge of being widely deployed in a variety of domains (e.g., personal assistance, healthcare, driverless cars, search and rescue, etc.). That these interactions will be charged with ethical significance should be self-evident and, clearly, these systems will be expected to navigate this ethically charged landscape responsibly. As correct ethical behavior not only involves not doing certain things but also doing certain things to bring about ideal states of affairs, ethical issues concerning the behavior of such complex and dynamic systems are likely to exceed the grasp of their designers and elude simple, static solutions. To date, the determination and mitigation of the ethical concerns of such systems has largely been accomplished by simply preventing systems from engaging in ethically unacceptable behavior in a predetermined, ad hoc manner, often unnecessarily constraining the system's set of possible behaviors and domains of deployment. We assert that the behavior of such systems should be guided by explicitly represented ethical principles determined through a consensus of ethicists. Principles are comprehensive and comprehensible declarative abstractions that succinctly represent this consensus in a centralized, extensible, and auditable way. Systems guided by such principles are likely to behave in a more acceptably ethical manner, permitting a richer set of behaviors in a wider range of domains than systems not so guided.
Some claim that no actions can be said to be ethically correct because all value judgments are relative either to societies or individuals. We maintain, however, along with most ethicists, that there is agreement on the ethically relevant features in many particular cases of ethical dilemmas and on the right course of action in those cases. Just as stories of disasters often overshadow positive stories in the news, so difficult ethical issues are often the subject of discussion rather than those that have been resolved, making it seem as if there is no consensus in ethics. Although, admittedly, a consensus of ethicists may not exist for a number of domains and actions, such a consensus seems likely to emerge in many areas in which intelligent autonomous systems are apt to be deployed and for the actions they are liable to undertake as we are more likely to agree on how machines ought to treat us than on how human beings ought to treat one another. For instance, in the process of generating and evaluating principles for this project, we have found there is a greater consensus concerning ethically preferable actions in the domains of medication reminding, search and rescue, and assisted driving (domains where it is likely that robots will be permitted to function) than in the domain of medical treatment negotiation (where it would be less likely that we would wish robots to function) (see the Discussion section of this paper for more details). In any case, we assert that machines should not be making decisions where there is genuine disagreement among ethicists about what is ethically correct.
We contend that even some of the most basic system actions have an ethical dimension. For instance, simply choosing a fully awake state over a sleep state consumes more energy and shortens the lifespan of a system. Given this, to help ensure ethical behavior, a system's set of possible ethically significant actions should be weighed against each other to determine which is the most ethically preferable at any given moment. It is likely that ethical action preference of a large set of actions will be difficult or impossible to define extensionally as an exhaustive list of instances and instead will need to be defined intensionally in the form of rules. This more concise definition may be possible since action preference is only dependent upon a likely smaller set of ethically relevant features that actions involve. Ethically relevant features are those circumstances that affect the ethical assessment of the action. Given this, action preference might be more succinctly stated in terms of satisfaction or violation of duties to either minimize or maximize (as appropriate) each ethically relevant feature. We refer to intensionally defined action preference as a principle [1] .
Such a principle might be used to define a transitive binary relation over a set of ethically relevant actions (each represented as the satisfaction/violation values of their duties) that partitions it into subsets ordered by ethical preference (with actions within the same partition having equal preference). This relation could be used to sort a list of possible actions and find the most ethically preferable action(s) of that list. This might form the basis of a principle-based behavior paradigm: a system decides its next action by using a principle to determine the most ethically preferable one(s). If such principles are explicitly represented, they may have the further benefit of helping justify a system's actions as they can provide pointed, logical explanations as to why one action was chosen over another.
Although it may be fruitful to develop ethical principles for the guidance of autonomous machine behavior, it is a complex process that involves determining what the ethical dilemmas are in terms of ethically relevant features, which duties need to be considered, and how to weigh them when they pull in different directions. To help contend with this complexity, we have developed G E , a general ethical dilemma analyzer that, through a dialog with ethicists, helps codify ethical principles from specific cases of ethical dilemmas in any given domain. Of course, other interested and informed parties need to be involved in the discussions leading up to case specification and determination but, like any other highly trained specialists, ethicists have an expertise in abstracting away details and encapsulating situations into the ethically relevant features and duties required to permit their use in other applicable situations. G E uses inductive logic programming [2] to infer a principle of ethical action preference from these cases that is complete and consistent in relation to them. As the principles discovered are most general specializations, they cover more cases than those used in their specialization and, therefore, can be used to make and justify provisional determinations about untested cases. These cases can also provide a further means of justification for a system's actions through analogy: as an action is chosen for execution by a system, clauses of the principle that were instrumental in its selection can be determined and, as clauses of principles can be traced to the training cases from which they were abstracted, these cases and their origin can be ascertained and used as justification for a system's actions.
Our work has been inspired by John Rawls' "reflective equilibrium" [3] approach to creating and refining ethical principles:
"The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth among our considered judgments (some say our "intuitions") about particular instances or cases, the principles or rules that we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them. The method succeeds and we achieve reflective equilibrium when we arrive at an acceptable coherence among these beliefs. An acceptable coherence requires that our beliefs not only be consistent with each other (a weak requirement), but that some of these beliefs provide support or provide a best explanation for others. Moreover, in the process we may not only modify prior beliefs but add new beliefs as well. There need be no assurance the reflective equilibrium is stable -we may modify it as new elements arise in our thinking. In practical contexts, this deliberation may help us come to a conclusion about what we ought to do when we had not at all been sure earlier." -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
In the following we detail the representation schema we have developed to represent ethical dilemmas and principles, the learning algorithm used by the system to gener-ate ethical principles as well as the system's user interface, the resulting principles that the system has discovered¹ as well as their evaluation, related research, and our conclusion.
Experimental procedures

Representation schema
Ethical action preference is ultimately dependent upon the ethically relevant features that actions involve such as harm, benefit, respect for autonomy, etc. A feature is represented as an integer that specifies the degree of its presence (positive value) or absence (negative value) in a given action. For each ethically relevant feature, there is a duty incumbent upon an agent to either minimize that feature (as would be the case for, say, harm) or maximize it (as would be the case for, say, respect for autonomy). A duty is represented as an integer that specifies the degree of its satisfaction (positive value) or violation (negative value) in a given action.
From the perspective of ethics, actions are characterized solely by the degrees of presence or absence of the ethically relevant features it involves and so, indirectly, the duties it satisfies or violates. An action is represented as a tuple of integers each representing the degree to which it satisfies or violates a given duty. A case relates two actions and is represented as a tuple of the differentials of the corresponding duty satisfaction/violation degrees of the actions being related. In a positive case, the duty satisfaction/violation degrees of the less ethically preferable action are subtracted from the corresponding values in the more ethically preferable action, producing a tuple of values representing how much more or less the ethically preferable action satisfies or violates each duty than the less ethically preferable action. In a negative case, the subtrahend and minuend are exchanged.
A principle of ethical action preference is defined as an irreflexive disjunctive normal form predicate p in terms 1 It should be noted that the principles developed for this paper were based upon the judgement of the project ethicist alone. Although, ideally, we advocate gathering a consensus of ethicists regarding the ethically relevant features and preferable actions in cases from which principles are abstracted, timely resources were not available to do so. That said, as will be shown subsequently, ex post facto testing confirms the project ethicist's judgements to indeed be the consensus view.
of lower bounds for duty differentials of a case:
where ∆d i denotes the differential of the corresponding satisfaction/violation degrees of duty i in actions a 1 and a 2 and v i,j denotes the lower bound of the lower bound of the differential of duty i in disjunct j such that p(a 1 , a 2 ) returns true if action a 1 is ethically preferable to action a 2 . A principle is represented as a tuple of tuples, one tuple for each disjunct, with each such disjunct tuple comprised of lower bound degrees for each duty differential.
To help make this representation more perspicuous, consider a dilemma type in the domain of assisted driving:
The driver of the car is either speeding, not staying in his/her lane, or about to hit an object. Should an automated control of the car take over operation of the vehicle? Although the set of possible actions is circumscribed in this example dilemma type, it serves to demonstrate the complexity of choosing ethically correct actions and how principles can serve as an abstraction to help manage this complexity.
Some of the ethically relevant features involved in this dilemma type might be 1) collision, 2) staying in lane, 3) respect for driver autonomy, 4) keeping within speed limit, and 5) imminent harm to persons. Duties to minimize features 1 and 5 and to maximize each features 2, 3, and 4 seem most appropriate, that is there is a duty to minimize collision, a duty to maximize staying in lane, etc. With maximizing duties, an action's degree of satisfaction or violation of that duty is identical to the action's degree of presence or absence of each corresponding feature. With duties to minimize a given feature, that duty's degree is equal to the negation of its corresponding feature degree.
The following cases illustrate how positive cases can be constructed from the satisfaction/violation values for the duties in involved and the determination of the ethically preferable action. Table 1 details satisfaction/violation values for each duty for both possible actions for each case in question (with each case's ethically preferable action displayed in small caps). In practice, we maintain that the values in these cases should be determined by a consensus of ethicists. As this example is provided simply to illustrate how the system works, the current values were determined by the project ethicist using her expertise in the field of ethics. Case 1: There is an object ahead in the driver's lane and the driver moves into another lane that is clear. As the ethically preferable action is do not take control, the positive case is (do not take control -take control) or (0, 0, 2, 0, 0).
Case 2:
The driver has been going in and out of his/her lane with no objects discernible ahead. As the ethically preferable action is take control, the positive case is (take control -do not take control) or (0, 2, -2, 0, 0).
Case 3:
The driver is speeding to take a passenger to a hospital. The GPS destination is set for a hospital. As the ethically preferable action is do not take control, the positive case is (do not take control -take control) or (0, 0, 2, -2, 2). Case 4: Driving alone, there is a bale of hay ahead in the driver's lane. There is a vehicle close behind that will run the driver's vehicle upon sudden braking and he/she can't change lanes, all of which can be determined by the system. The driver starts to brake. As the ethically preferable action is take control, the positive case is (take control -do not take control) or (1, 0, -2, 0, 4).
Case 5:
The driver is greatly exceeding the speed limit with no discernible mitigating circumstances. As the ethically preferable action is take control, the positive case is (take control -do not take control) or (0, 0, -2, 4, 0). Case 6: There is a person in front of the driver's car and he/she can't change lanes. Time is fast approaching when the driver will not be able to avoid hitting this person and he/she has not begun to brake. As the ethically preferable action is take control, the positive case is (take control -do not take control) or (0, 0, -2, 0, 2). Negative cases can be generated from these positive cases by interchanging actions when taking the difference. For instance, in Case 1 since the ethically preferable action is do not take control, the negative case is (take control -do not take control) or (0, 0, -2, 0, 0). It is from such a collection of positive and negative cases that G E abstracts a principle of ethical action preference as described in the next section.
Learning algorithm
As noted earlier, G E uses inductive logic programming (ILP) to infer a principle of ethical action preference from cases that is complete and consistent in relation to these cases. More formally, a definition of a predicate p is discovered such that p(a 1 , a 2 ) returns true if action a1 is ethically preferable to action a 2 . Also noted earlier, the principles discovered are most general specializations, covering more cases than those used in their specialization and, therefore, can be used to make and justify provisional determinations about untested cases.
G E is committed only to a knowledge representation scheme based on the concepts of ethically relevant features with corresponding degrees of presence or absence from which duties to minimize or maximize these features with corresponding degrees of satisfaction or violation of those duties are inferred. The system has no a priori knowledge regarding what particular features, degrees, and duties in a given domain might be but determines them in conjunction with its trainer as it is presented with example cases. Besides minimizing bias, there are two other advantages to this approach. Firstly, the principle in question can be tailored to the domain with which one is concerned. Different sets of ethically relevant features and duties can be discovered, through consideration of examples of dilemmas in the different domains in which machines will operate. Secondly, features and duties can be added or removed if it becomes clear that they are needed or redundant.
G E starts with a most general principle that simply states that all actions are equally ethically preferable (that is p(a 1 , a 2 ) returns true for all pairs of actions). An ethical dilemma type and two possible actions are input, defining the domain of the current cases and principle. The system then accepts example cases of this dilemma type. A case is represented by the ethically relevant features a given pair of possible actions exhibits, as well as the determination as to which is the ethically preferable action (as specified by a consensus of ethicists) given these features. Features are further delineated by the degree to which they are present or absent in the actions in question. From this information, duties are inferred either to maximize that feature (when it is present in the ethically preferable action or absent in the non-ethically preferable action) or minimize that feature (when it is absent in the ethically preferable action or present in the non-ethically preferable action). As features are presented to the system, the representation of cases is updated to include these inferred duties and the current possible range of their degree of satisfaction or violation.
As new cases of a given ethical dilemma type are presented to the system, new duties and wider ranges of degrees are generated in G E through resolution of contradictions that arise. With two ethically identical cases (i.e., cases with the same ethically relevant feature(s) to the same degree of satisfaction or violation) an action cannot be right in one of these cases while the comparable action in the other case is considered to be wrong. Formal representation of ethical dilemmas and their solutions make it possible for machines to detect such contradictions as they arise. If the original determinations are correct, then there must either be a qualitative distinction or a quantitative difference between the cases that must be revealed. This can be translated into a difference in the ethically relevant features between the two cases, or a wider range of the degree of presence or absence of existing features must be considered, revealing a difference between the cases. In other words, either there is a feature that appears in one but not in the other case, or there is a greater degree of presence or absence of existing features in one but not in the other case. In this fashion, G E systematically helps construct a concrete representation language that makes explicit features, their possible degrees of presence or absence, duties to maximize or minimize them, and their possible degrees of satisfaction or violation.
Ethical preference is determined from differentials of satisfaction/violation values of the corresponding duties of two actions of a case. Given two actions a 1 and a 2 and duty d, an arbitrary member of this vector of differentials can be notated as da 1 -da 2 or simply ∆d. If an action a 1 satisfies a duty d more (or violates it less) than another action a 2 , then a 1 is ethically preferable to a 2 with respect to that duty. For example, given a duty with the possible values of +1 (for satisfied), -1 (for violated) and 0 (for not involved), the possible range of the differential between the corresponding duty values is -2 to +2. That is, if this duty was satisfied in a 1 and violated in a 2 , the differential for this duty in these actions would be 1--1 or +2. On the other hand, if this duty was violated in a 1 and satisfied in a 2 , the differential for this duty in these actions would be -1-1 or -2. Although a principle can be defined that captures the notion of ethical preference in these cases simply as p(a 1 , a 2 ) → ∆d = 2, such a definition over fits the given cases leaving no room for it to make determinations concerning untested cases. To overcome this limitation, what is required is a less specific principle that still covers (i.e., returns true for) positive cases (those where the first action is ethically preferable to the second) and does not cover negative cases (those where the first action is not ethically preferable to the second). G E 's approach is to generate a principle that is a most general specification by starting with the most general principle (i.e., one that returns true for all cases) and incrementally specialize it so that it no longer returns true for any negative cases while still returning true for all positive ones. These conditions correspond to the logical properties of consistency and completeness, respectively. In the single duty example above, the most general principle can be defined as p(a 1 , a 2 ) → ∆d = -2 as the duty differentials in both the positive and negative cases satisfy the inequality. The specialization that the system employs is to incre-mentally raise the lower bounds of duties. In the example, the lower bound is raised by 1 resulting in the principle p(a 1 , a 2 ) → ∆d = -1 which is true for the positive case (where ∆d = +2) and false for the negative one (where ∆d = -2). Unlike the earlier over-fitted principle, this principle covers a positive case not in its training set. Consider when duty d is neither satisfied nor violated in a 2 (denoted by a 0 value for that duty). In this case, given a value of +1, a 1 is ethically preferable than a 2 since it satisfies d more. This untested case is correctly covered by the principle as ∆d = 1 satisfies its inequality.
This simple example also shows why determinations on untested cases must be considered provisional. Consider when duty d has the same value in both actions. These cases are negative examples (neither action is ethically preferable to the other in any of them) but all are still covered by the principle as ∆d = 0 satisfies its inequality. The solution to this inconsistency in this case is to specialize the principle even further to avoid covering these negative cases resulting in the final consistent and complete principle p(a 1 , a 2 ) → ∆d ≥ 1. This simply means that, to be considered ethically preferable, an action has to satisfy duty d by at least 1 more than the other action in question (or violate it less by at least that amount).
As a more representative example see Appendix A where we consider how G E operates in the first four cases of the previously detailed assisted-driving domain. Dilemma type, features, duties, and cases are specified incrementally by an ethicist; the system uses this information to determine a principle that will cover all input positive cases without covering any of their corresponding negative cases.
We have chosen ILP for both its ability to handle non-linear relationships and its explanatory power. Previously [4] , we proved formally that simply assigning linear weights to duties isn't sufficient to capture the non-linear relationships between duties. The explanatory power of the principle discovered using ILP is compelling: As an action is chosen for execution by a system, clauses of the principle that were instrumental in its selection can be determined and used to formulate an explanation of why that particular action was chosen over the others. Further, as clauses of principles can be traced to the cases from which they were abstracted, these cases and their origin can provide support for a selected action through analogy.
ILP also seems better suited than statistical methods to domains in which training examples are scarce, as is the case when seeking consensuses in the domain of ethics. For example, although support vector machines (SVM) are known to handle non-linear data, the explanatory power of the models generated is next to nil [5, 6] . To mitigate this weakness, rule extraction techniques must be applied but, for techniques that work on non-linear relationships, it may be the case that the extracted rules are neither exclusive nor exhaustive or that a number of training cases need to be set aside for the rule extraction process [5, 6] . Neither of these conditions seems suitable for the task at hand.
While decision tree induction [7] seems to offer a more rigorous methodology than ILP, the rule extracted from a decision tree induced from the example cases given previously (using any splitting function) covers fewer nontraining examples and is less perspicuous than the most general specification produced by ILP.
We are attempting, with our representation, to get at the distilled core of ethical decision-making -that is, what, precisely, is ethically relevant and how do these entities relate. We have termed these entities ethically relevant features and their relationships principles. Although the vector representation chosen may, on its surface, appear insufficient to represent this information, it is not at all clear how higher order representations would better further our goal. For example, case-based reasoning would not produce the distillation we are seeking. Further, it does not seem that the task at hand would benefit from predicate logic. Quinlan [7] , in his defense of the use of predicate logic as a representation language, offers two principle weaknesses of attribute-value representation (such as we are using):
1. an object must be specified by its values for a fixed set of attributes and 2. rules must be expressed as functions of these same attributes.
In our approach, the first weakness is mitigated by the fact that our representation is dynamic. Inspired by Bundy and McNeil [8] , and made feasible by Allegro Common Lisp's Metaobject Protocol, the number of features and their ranges expands and contracts precisely as needed to represent the current set of cases. The second weakness does not seem to apply in that principles in fact do seem to be fully representable in such a fashion, requiring no higher order relationships between features to be described.
Clearly, there are other factors involved in ethical decision-making but we would claim that, in themselves, they are not features but rather meta-features -entities that affect the values of features and, as such, may not properly belong in the distillation we are seeking, but instead to components of a system using the principle that seek actions' current values for its features. These include time and probability: what is the value for a feature at a given time and what is the probability that this value is indeed the case. That said, there may also be a sense in which probability is somehow associated with clauses of the principle, for instance the certainty associated with the training examples from which a clause is derived, gleaned perhaps by the size of the majority consensus. If this does indeed turn out to be the case, adding the dimension of probability to the principle representation might be in order and might be accomplished via probabilistic inductive reasoning [9] .
User interface
G E 's interface permits the creation of new dilemma types, as well as saving, opening, and restoring them. It also permits the addition, renaming, and deletion of features without the need for case entry. Cases can be added, edited, and deleted and both the collection of cases and all details of the principle can be displayed. There is an extensive help system that includes a guidance capability that makes suggestions as to what type of case might further refine the principle. Figure 1 shows the Dilemma Type Entry dialog with data entered from the example dilemma detailed earlier including the dilemma type name, an optional textual description, and descriptors for each of the two possible actions in the dilemma type. 1. An area for entering the unique name of the case. (If no name is entered, the system generates a unique name for the case that, if desired, can be modified later by editing the case.) 2. And area for an optional textual description of the case. 3. Radio buttons for specifying which of the two actions is ethically preferable in this case. 4. Tabs for each feature of the case. New features are added by clicking on the tab labeled "New...". Features can be inspected by selecting their corresponding tab. 5. A button to delete a feature of the case. 6. Radio buttons for choosing the presence or absence of the currently tabbed ethically relevant feature. 7. An area for entering a value for the degree of the currently tabbed ethically relevant feature. Values entered here that are greater than the greatest current possible value for a feature increase that possible value to this value.
8. Up-down arrows for choosing the degree of the currently tabbed ethically relevant feature constrained by its current greatest possible value. 9. An area for entering the name of the currently tabbed ethically relevant feature. 10. A drop-down menu for choosing the name of the currently tabbed ethically relevant feature from a list of previously entered ethically relevant features. 11. Radio buttons for choosing the action to which the currently tabbed ethically relevant feature pertains.
If Help is chosen, a description of the information being sought is displayed. If Done is chosen, a Case Confirmation dialog appears displaying a table of duty values generated for the case. Figure 3 shows a confirmation dialog for Case 2 in the example dilemma. The ethically preferable action, features, and corresponding duties are detailed. The particulars for each feature is displayed in its own tab, one for each such feature present in the case. Inferred satisfaction/violation values for each corresponding duty (and each action) are displayed in a table at the bottom of the dialog. As cases are entered, a natural language version of the discovered principle is displayed, disjunct-by-disjunct, in a tabbed window (Figure 4) . Further, a graph of the interrelationships between these cases and their corresponding duties and principle clauses is continually updated and displayed below the disjunct tabs. This graph is derived from a database of the data gathered through both input and learning. Cases are linked to the features they exhibit which in turn are linked to their corresponding duties. Further, each case is linked to a disjunct that it satisfied in the tabbed principle above. Figure 5 highlights the details of graphs generated by the system: 1. A node representing a case. Each case entered is represented by name with such a node. If selected and right-clicked, the option to edit or delete the case is presented. 2. A node representing a feature. Each feature entered either on its own or in conjunction with a case is represented by name with such a node. If selected and right-clicked, and the feature is not currently associated with a case, the option to rename or delete the feature is presented or, if the feature is currently associated with a case, only the option to rename the feature is presented. 3. A node representing a duty. Each duty generated is represented by its corresponding feature name and requirement to maximize or minimize that feature with such a node. As duties are generated by the system and can only be modified indirectly by modification of their corresponding feature, there are no options available for their modification on the graph. 4. A node representing a disjunct of the principle. Each disjunct is represented by the number it is associated with in the disjunct tabs with such a node. As disjuncts are generated by the system and can only be modified indirectly by modification of the example cases, there are no options available for their modification on the graph. 5. A link representing the relationship satisfied-by which signifies that a particular disjunct of the principle (denoted by its number) is true for a particular case (denoted by its name). Hovering over links will reveal the relationship they denote. As links are generated by the system and can only be modified indirectly by modification of the example cases, there are no options available for their modification on the graph. 6. A link representing the relationship is-contingentupon which signifies that a particular duty (denoted by its corresponding feature name and requirement to maximize or minimize that feature) is associated with a particular feature (denoted by its name). Hovering over links will reveal the relationship they denote. As links are generated by the system and can only be modified indirectly by modification of the example cases, there are no options available for their modification on the graph. 7. A link representing the relationship has-feature that signifies that a particular case (denoted by the its name) has a particular feature (denoted by its name).
Hovering over links will reveal the relationship they denote. As links are generated by the system and can only be modified indirectly by modification of the example cases, there are no options available for their modification on the graph. 8. A pair of nodes that denotes a feature and its corresponding duty linked with a is-contingent-upon relationship that is not currently associated with any case.
The system helps create a complete and consistent principle in a number of ways. It generates negative cases from positive ones entered (simply reversing the duty values for the actions in question) and presents them to the learning system as cases that should not be covered. Determinations of cases are checked for plausibility by ensuring that the action deemed ethically preferable satisfies at least one duty more than the less ethically preferable action (or at least violates it less). As a contradiction indicates inconsistency, the system also checks for these between newly entered cases and previous cases, prompting the user for their resolution by a change in the determination, a new feature, or a new degree range for an existing feature in the cases.
The system can also provide guidance that leads more quickly to a more complete principle. It seeks cases from the user that either specify the opposite action of that of an existing case as ethically preferable or contradicts previous cases (i.e., cases that have the same features to the same degree but different determinations as to the correct action in that case). The system also seeks cases that involve duties and combinations of duties that are not yet represented in the principle. In doing so, new features, degree ranges, and duties are discovered that extend the principle, permitting it to cover more cases correctly. Lastly, incorrect system choice of minimization or maximization of a newly inferred duty signals that further delineation of the case in question is needed.
(The software is freely available at : http://uhaweb. hartford.edu/anderson/Site/GenEth.html.)
Results
In the following, we document a number of principles obtained from G E . These principles are not necessarily complete statements of the ethical concerns of the represented domains as it is likely that it will require more consensus cases to produce such principles. That said, we believe that these results suggest that creating such principles in a wide variety of domains may be possible using G E .
Medical treatment options
As a first validation of G E , the system was used to rediscover representations and principles necessary to represent and resolve a variation of the general type of ethical dilemma in the domain of medical ethics previously discovered in [10] . In that work, an ethical dilemma was considered concerning medical treatment options:
A
health care worker has recommended a particular treatment for her competent adult patient and the patient has rejected that treatment option. Should the health care worker try again to change the patient's mind or accept the patient's decision as final?
This dilemma involves the duties of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and respect for autonomy and a principle discovered that correctly (as per a consensus of ethicists) balanced these duties in all cases represented. The discovered principle was: In English, this might be stated as: "A healthcare worker should challenge a patient's decision if it isn't fully autonomous and there's either any violation of nonmaleficence or a severe violation of beneficence."
Although clearly latent in the judgments of ethicists, to our knowledge, this principle had never been stated before -a principle quantitatively relating three pillars of biomedical ethics: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, and beneficence. This principle was then used as a basis for an advisor system, M E E [10] , that solicits data pertinent to a current case from the user and provides advice concerning which action would be chosen according to its training.
Medication reminding
A variation of this dilemma type used in this validation of G E concerns guiding medication-reminding behavior of an autonomous robot [10, 11] :
A doctor has prescribed a medication that should to be taken at a particular time. When reminded, the patient says that he wants to take it later. Should the system notify the overseer that the patient won't take the medication at the prescribed time or not?
Where the previous work assumed specific duties and specific ranges of satisfaction/violation degrees for these duties thus biasing the learning algorithm toward them, G E lifts these assumptions, assuming only that such duties and ranges exist without specifying what they are. The principle discovered by G E for this dilemma was:
∧∆max respect for autonomy ≥ − 1 Although, originally, the robot simply used the initially discovered principle, it turns out that that principle covered more cases than necessary for its guidance -the choices of the autonomous system do not require as wide a range of values for the duty to maximize respect for autonomy (note that the differences between the principles only involve this particular duty). As this new principle gives equivalent responses for the current dilemma to that given by the principle discovered in the previous research, G E was shown able, in its interaction with an ethicist, to not only discover this principle but also to determine the knowledge representation scheme required to do so while making minimal assumptions.
Medical treatment options (extended)
The next step in system validation was to introduce a case not used in the previous research and show how G E can leverage its power to extend this principle. This new case is:
A doctor has prescribed a particular medication that ideally should be taken at a particular time in order for the patient to receive a small benefit; but, when reminded, the patient refuses to respond, one way or the other.
The ethically preferable action in this case is notify but, when given values for its features, the system determines that it contradicts a previous case in which the same values and features call for do not notify. Given this, the user is asked to revisit the cases and decides that the new case involves the absence of the ethically relevant feature of interaction. From this, the system infers a new duty to maximize interaction that, when the user supplies values for it in the contradicting cases, resolves the contradiction. The system produced this principle, adding a new clause to the previous one to cover the new feature and corresponding duty gleaned from the new case:
∧∆max respect for autonomy ≥ − 1
Assisted driving
To demonstrate domain independence, G E was next used to begin to codify ethical principles in the domains of assisted driving and search and rescue. From all six cases of the example domain pertaining to assisted driving presented previously, the following disjunctive normal form principle, complete and consistent with respect to its training cases, was abstracted by G E : A system-generated graph of these cases along with their relevant features, corresponding duties, and satisfied principle disjuncts is depicted in Figure 4 . From this graph, it can be determined that Case 1 is covered by disjunct 4, Case 2 by disjunct 1, Case 3 by disjunct 3, Case 4 by disjunct 2, Case 5 by disjunct 5, and Case 6 by disjunct 3 (again).
This principle, being abstracted from a relatively few cases, does not encompass the entire gamut of behavior one might expect from an assisted driving system nor all the interactions possible of the behaviors that are present. That said, the abstracted principle concisely represents a number of important considerations for assisted driving systems. Less formally, it states that staying in one's lane is important; collisions (damage to vehicles) and/or causing harm to persons should be avoided; and speeding should be prevented unless there is the chance that it is occurring to try to save a life, thus minimizing harm to others. Presenting more cases to the system will clearly further refine the principle.
In the domain of search and rescue, the following dilemma type was presented to the system:
A robot must decide to take either Path A or Path B to attempt to rescue persons after a natural disaster. They are trapped and cannot save themselves. Given certain further information (and only this information) about the circumstances, should it take Path A or Path B?
As in the assisted driving example, the set of possible actions is circumscribed in this example dilemma type, and the required capabilities just beyond current technology. Some of the ethically relevant features involved in this dilemma type might be 1) number of persons to be saved, 2) threat of imminent death, and 3) danger to the robot. In this case, duties to maximize the first feature and minimize each of the other two features seem most appropriate, that is there is a duty to maximize the number of persons to be saved, a duty to minimize the threat of imminent death, and minimize danger to the robot. Given these duties, an action's degree of satisfaction or violation of the first duty is identical to the action's degree of presence or absence of its corresponding feature. In the other two cases, the duties' degrees are the negation of its corresponding feature degree.
The following cases illustrate how actions might be represented as tuples of duty satisfaction/violation degrees and how positive cases can be constructed from them (duty degrees in each tuple are ordered as the features in the previous paragraph): 1, 2, 0) . As the ethically preferable action is take path B, the positive case is (take path B -take path A) or (-1, 4, 0). Case 3: Although there are a greater number of persons to be saved by taking Path A rather than Path B, it is extremely dangerous for the robot to take Path A (e.g., it is known that the ground is very unstable along that path, making it likely that the robot will be irreparably damaged). This is not the case if the robot takes Path B. The take path A action's duty values are (2, 0, -2); the take path B action's duty values are (1, 0, 2). As the ethically preferable action is take path B, the positive case is (take path B -take path A) or (-1, 0, 4).
The following disjunctive normal form principle, complete and consistent with respect to its training cases, was abstracted from these cases by G E : The principle asserts that the rescue robot should take the path where there are a greater number of persons to be saved unless either there is a threat of imminent death to only the lesser number of persons or it is extremely dangerous for the robot only if it takes that path. Thus either the threat of imminent death or extreme danger for the robot trumps attempting to rescue the greater number of persons. This makes sense given that, in the first case, if the robot were to act otherwise it would lead to deaths that might have been avoided and, in the second case, it would likely lead to the robot not being able to rescue anyone because it would likely become disabled.
Discussion
To evaluate the principles codified by G E , we have developed an Ethical Turing Test -a variant of the "Imitation Game" (aka Turing Test) Alan Turing [12] suggested as a means to determine whether the term "intelligence" can be applied to a machine that bypassed disagreements about the definition of intelligence. This variant tests whether the term "ethical" can be applied to a machine by comparing the ethically-preferable action specified by an ethicist in an ethical dilemma with that of a machine faced with the same dilemma. If a significant number of answers given by the machine match the answers given by the ethicist, then it has passed the test. Such evaluation holds the machine-generated principle to the highest standards and, further, permits evidence of incremental improvement as the number of matches increases (see [13] for the inspiration of this test; see Appendix C for the complete test).
The Ethical Turing Test we administered was comprised of 28 multiple-choice questions in four domains, one for each principle that was codified by G E (see Figure 6 ). These questions are drawn both from training (60%) and non-training cases (40%). It was administered to five ethicists, one of which (Ethicist 1) serves as the ethicist on the project. All are philosophers who specialize in applied ethics, and who are familiar with issues in technology.
Clearly more ethicists with pointed backgrounds in the domains under consideration should be used in a complete evaluation (which is beyond the scope of this paper). That said, it important to show how ethical principles derived from our method might be evaluated. Thus, it is the approach that we believe should be considered, rather than considering our test to be a definitive evaluation of the principles.
Of the 140 questions, the ethicists agreed with the system's judgment on 123 of them or about 88% of the time. This is a promising result and, as this is the first incarnation of this test, we believe that this result can be improved by simply rewording test questions to more pointedly reflect the ethical features involved.
Ethicist 1 was in agreement with the system in all cases (100%), clearly to be expected in the training cases but it is a reassuring result in the non-training cases. Training cases are those cases from which the system learns principles; non-training cases are cases distinct from training cases that are used to test the abstracted principles. Ethicist 2 and Ethicist 5 were both in agreement with the system in all but three of the questions or about 89% of the time. Ethicist 3 was in agreement with the system in all but four of the questions or about 86% of the time. Ethicist 4, who had the most disagreement with the system, still was in agreement with the system in all but seven of the questions or 75% of the time.
It is of note that of the 17 responses in which ethicists were not in agreement with the system (denoted by the shaded cells), none was a majority opinion. That is, in 17 dilemmas there was total agreement with the system (denoted by the columns without shaded cells, note that the fact that this number equals the number of shaded cells is coincidental) and in the 11 remaining dilemmas where there wasn't, the majority of the ethicists agreed with the system. We believe that the majority agreement in all 28 dilemmas shows a consensus among these ethicists in these dilemmas. The most contested domain (the second) is one in which it is less likely that a system would be expected to function due to its ethically sensitive nature: Should the health care worker try again to change the patient's mind or accept the patient's decision as final regarding treatment options? That this consensus is particularly clear in the three domains best suited for autonomous systems -medication reminding, search and rescue, and assisted-driving -bodes well for further consensus building in domains where autonomous systems are likely to function.
Although many have voiced concern over the impending need for machine ethics for decades [14] [15] [16] , there has been little research effort made towards accomplishing this goal. Some of this effort has been expended attempting to establish the feasibility of using a particular ethical theory as a foundation for machine ethics without actually attempting implementation: Christopher Grau [17] considers whether the ethical theory that best lends itself to implementation in a machine, Utilitarianism, should be used as the basis of machine ethics; Tom Powers [18] assesses the viability of using deontic and default logics to implement Kant's categorical imperative.
Efforts by others that do attempt implementation have largely been based, to greater or lesser degree, upon casuistry -the branch of applied ethics that, eschewing principle-based approaches to ethics, attempts to determine correct responses to new ethical dilemmas by drawing conclusions based on parallels with previous cases in which there is agreement concerning the correct response. Rafal Rzepka and Kenji Araki [19] , at what might be considered the most extreme degree of casuistry, have explored how statistics learned from examples of ethical intuition drawn from the full spectrum of the World Wide Web might be useful in furthering machine ethics in the domain of safety assurance for household robots. Marcello Guarini [20] , at a less extreme degree of casuistry, has investigated a neural network approach where particular actions concerning killing and allowing to die are classified as acceptable or unacceptable depending upon different motives and consequences. Bruce McLaren [21] , in the spirit of a more pure form of casuistry, uses a case-based reasoning approach to develop a system that leverages information concerning a new ethical dilemma to predict which previously stored principles and cases are relevant to it in the domain of professional engineering ethics without making judgments.
There have also been efforts to bring logical reasoning systems to bear in service of making ethical judgments, for instance deontic logic [22] and prospective logic [23] . These efforts provide further evidence of the computability of ethics but, in their generality, they do not adhere to any particular ethical theory and fall short of actually providing the principles needed to guide the behavior of autonomous systems.
Our approach is unique in that we are proposing a comprehensive, extensible, verifiable, domainindependent paradigm grounded in well-established ethical theory that will help ensure the ethical behavior of current and future autonomous systems. Currently, to show the feasibility of our approach, we are developing, with Vincent Berenz of the Max Planck Institute, a robot functioning in the domain of eldercare whose behavior is guided by an ethical principle abstracted from consensus cases using G E . The robot's current set of possible actions includes charging, reminding a patient to take his/her medication, seeking tasks, engaging with patient, warning a non-compliant patient, and notifying an overseer. Sensory data such as battery level, motion detection, vocal responses, and visual imagery as well as overseer input regarding an eldercare patient are used to determine values for action duties pertinent to the domain. Currently these include maximize honoring commitments, maximize readiness, minimize harm, maximize possible good, minimize non-interaction, maximize respect for autonomy, and minimize persistent immobility. Clearly these sets of values are only subsets of what will be required in situ but they are representative of them and can be extended. We have used the principle to develop a sorting routine that sorts actions (represented by their duty values) by their ethical preference. The robot's behavior at any given time is then determined by sorting its set of actions and choosing the highest ranked one.
In conclusion, we have created a representation schema for ethical dilemmas that permits the use of inductive logic programming techniques for the discovery of principles of ethical preference and have developed a system that employs this to the end of discovering general ethical principles from particular cases of ethical dilemma types in which there is agreement as to their resolution. Where there is disagreement, our ethical dilemma analyzer reveals precisely the nature of the disagreement (are there different ethically relevant features, different degrees of those features present, or is it that they have different relative weights?) for discussion and possible resolution.
We see this as a linchpin of a paradigm for the instantiation of ethical principles that guide the behavior of autonomous systems. It can be argued that such machine ethics ought to be the driving force in determining the extent to which autonomous systems should be permitted to interact with human beings. Autonomous systems that behave in a less than ethically acceptable manner towards human beings will not, and should not, be tolerated. Thus, it becomes paramount that we demonstrate that these systems will not violate the rights of human beings and will perform only those actions that follow acceptable ethical principles. Principles offer the further benefits of serving as a basis for justification of actions taken by a system as well as for an overarching control mechanism to manage behavior of such systems. Developing principles for this use is a complex process and new tools and methodologies will be needed to help contend with this complexity. We offer G E as one such tool and have shown how it can help mitigate this complexity. . Respect for autonomy, already being part of the system's knowledge representation scheme, does not need to be added to it and its corresponding duty has already been generated. The other two features are new to the system and therefore are added to its knowledge representation scheme. Further, two new duties are specified by the ethicist-maximize keeping within the speed limit and minimize imminent harm to persons.
A Appendix G E control flow
[IV] 22. As the first two duties (minimizing collision and maximizing staying in lane) are part of the system's knowledge representation scheme but not involved in this case, maximizing respect for autonomy is violated in take control but satisfied in do not take control, maximizing keeping within speed limit is satisfied in take control but violated in do not take control, and minimizing imminent harm to persons is violated in take control but satisfied in do not take control, the duty satisfaction/violation values for take control are (0, 0, -1, 1, -1) and the duty satisfaction/violation values for do not take control are (0, 0, 1, -1, 1).
[V] 23. System checks for inconsistencies and finds none. [VI] 24. System determines differentials of actions duty satisfaction/violation values as (0, 0, 2, -2, 2) [VII] and its negative case is generated (0, 0, -2, 2, -2).
[VIII] 25. Given the range of possible values for these duties in all cases (-1 to 1 for each duty), ranges for duty differentials are determined (-2 to 2).
[IX] 26. Case 2 and its generated negative case are added to set of cases [X] 27. Given values for these features in this case and its negative, ranges for the newly added features are determined (-1 to 1) and, indirectly, ranges for duty differentials (-2 to 2). 28. A principle containing a most general disjunct is generated ((-2, -2, -2, -2, -2)), including all features. 29. G E commences its learning process. [XI] 30. As Case 3 is covered by the current principle and its negative is not, the resulting principle derived from Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 combined does not need to change and therefore is the same as in step 20. 31. Case 4 is entered.
[III] The ethicist specifies that the correct action in this case is take control and determines that the ethically relevant features in this case are collision (present in take control, present in a greater degree in do not take control as collision with vehicle is worse than collision with bale), respect for driver autonomy (absent in take control, present in do not take control), and imminent harm to persons (significantly present in take control, significantly absent in do not take control). As all features are already part of the system's knowledge representation scheme, none need to be added to it and their corresponding duties have already been generated.
[IV] 32. As maximizing staying in lane and maximizing keeping within speed limit are part of the system's knowledge representation scheme but not involved in this case, minimizing collision is minimally violated in take control and maximally violated in do not take control, maximizing respect for driver autonomy is violated in take control but satisfied in do not take control, and minimizing imminent harm to persons is maximally satisfied in take control but maximally violated in do not take control, the duty satisfaction/violation values for take control are (-1, 0, -1, 0, 2) and the duty satisfaction/violation values for do not take control are (-2, 0, 1, 0, -2 
